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Abstract 
 
 
This study investigates the role of time-varying betas, event-induced variance and conditional 
heteroskedasticity in the estimation of abnormal returns around important news 
announcements. Our analysis is based on the stock price reaction to profit warnings issued by 
a sample of firms listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (HKEx). The standard event 
study methodology indicates the presence of price reversal patterns following both positive 
and negative warnings. However, incorporating time-varying betas, event-induced variance 
and conditional heteroskedasticity in the modelling process results in post-negative-warning 
price patterns that are consistent with the predictions of the efficient market hypothesis 
(EMH). These adjustments also cause the statistical significance of some post-positive-
warning cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) to disappear and their magnitude to drop to an 
extent that minor transaction costs would eliminate the profitability of the contrarian strategy.  
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1. Introduction 
This study investigates the market reaction to profit warnings1  in the Hong Kong Stock 
Exchange (HKEx). Empirical evidence on the price reaction to profit warnings is limited to a 
few markets, such as the US, the UK and mainland China. Clare (2001) shows that investors 
in the UK tend to overreact more to negative warnings than to positive ones. Using Chinese 
data, Lui et al. (2009) find that stock prices overreact to the negative news contained in profit 
warnings. Specifically, they report a significant price drop of about -3% over the [-1, +1] 
window and a significant price increase of 7.81% over the [+2, +60] window around negative 
warnings. Consistent with the overreaction hypothesis, Tucker (2004) documents that 
investors react more negatively to firms that warn, when they anticipate negative earnings 
news, than those that do not warn. Jackson and Madura (2003) examine stock price behavior 
around profit warnings containing negative news in the US market. They find a significant 
price drop of -21.7% over the eleven-day period ending five days after the announcement. 
However, they find no evidence of reversal after this period and conclude that the market 
reaction to negative warnings is not excessive. 
Previous studies on the stock price reaction to profit warnings are based on the 
standard event study methodology, which ignores the potential impact of news on stock betas 
and the residual variance (Brown et al. 1988; Corrado and Jordan 1997; Cyree and 
DeGennaro 2002; Lui et al. 2009; Savickas 2003; Zolotoy 2011; Cam and Ramiah 2014), a 
deficiency that may hinder the testing of the efficient market hypothesis (EMH). 2 
Specifically, if a stock’s beta changes after the event date, the use of the pre-event beta may 
result in inaccurate abnormal return estimates. Furthermore, several studies argue that 
ignoring the heteroskedastic nature of volatility and event-induced variance will lead to 
biased market model parameter estimates and inconsistent test statistics (e.g., Akgiray 1989; 
Corhay and Tourani-Rad 1994). 
                                                          
1  Profit warnings are announcements made by publicly traded companies, prior to the issuance of their formal 
financial reports, to warn investors that their earnings will differ from previously expected levels. Profit 
warnings can be either positive or negative. 
2
 See Yen and Lee (2008) for a thorough review of the literature on efficiency market hypothesis. 
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It is widely documented in the literature that equity betas are not constant over time. 
For example, Klemkosky and Martin (1975) and Bollerslev et al. (1988) argue that investors’ 
expected returns are conditional on the information available at any particular point in time 
and their consistent reestimation of factor returns causes the betas of risky assets to vary 
considerably over time. Consistent with this prediction, several studies find that estimated 
betas exhibit statistically significant time variation (see, e.g., Harvey 1989; Ferson and 
Korajczyk 1995; Faff et al. 2000). Many researchers also show that the variation in betas is 
more pronounced around important news announcements. Zolotoy (2011), for instance, 
argues that, as equity value tends to rise (fall) following the arrival of good (bad) news, the 
weight attached to debt falls (rises). As such, the release of positive (negative) news 
decreases (increases) the riskiness of equity investments. Similarly, Lui et al. (2009) find that 
the systematic risk of individual stocks reacts asymmetrically to the positive and negative 
news contained in the analyst reports. However, Brown et al. (1988) argue that, as surprises 
increase uncertainty, stock betas should increase following both favourable and unfavourable 
surprises. Specifically, they claim that investors tend to set prices before the full ramifications 
of a dramatic financial event become known, and the arrival of news immediately causes 
risk-averse investors to set stock prices significantly below their conditional expected values. 
Using a sample of the 200 largest S&P firms over the period 1962-1985, Brown et al. (1988) 
show that the variance of returns, the residual variance and the coefficient of systematic risk 
exhibit significant increases following daily residual returns in excess of 2.5 (sign ignored). 
Kalay and Lowenstein (1985) argue that, since events convey information to the market, 
stock price volatility should also increase in the post-announcement period. They also 
maintain that the incremental risk above that on a random day may not be fully diversifiable. 
Using a sample of 302 US firms for the period 1962-1980, they show that stock betas exhibit 
a significant increase in the aftermath of dividend announcements. More recently, Patton and 
Verardo (2012) propose a simple learning model, which suggest that investors use firm-
specific news to extract information on the aggregate economy. They argue that since 
earnings are affected by both market-wide and firm-specific conditions, investors can use 
earnings of the announcing firms to revise their expectations about the profitability of other 
firms in the economy. This process of learning across stocks is expected to drive up the 
comovement between announcing stocks and other stocks and yield an increase in the market 
beta of the announcing stocks. Consistent with the predictions of the learning model, Patton 
and Verardo show that the betas of the constituents of the S&P 500 increase significantly 
around earnings announcements, regardless of whether the news is good or bad.  
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The extant literature has recognised the importance of adjusting for stochastic 
volatility around the event period. For example, Brown and Warner (1980) argue that the 
failure to adjust for the event-induced variance may result in biased estimates of the 
traditional test statistics, and that the power of these tests can be improved by appropriately 
modelling the volatility process. To control for the event-induced variance, Boehmer et al. 
(1991) propose a statistical test, generated by first standardising event-period returns by the 
estimation-period standard deviation and then dividing the cross-sectional mean of the 
standardised returns by their cross-sectional standard deviation. Savickas (2003) argues that a 
limitation of Boehmer et al.’s approach stems from the implicit assumption that the event-
induced variance is the same across all sample stocks. Brockett et al. (1999) model the 
volatility process around the events using a market model with GARCH effects and time-
varying betas. However, their approach ignores the importance of event-induced variance. 
Savickas (2003) addresses the conditional heteroskedastic behavior of volatility and the 
event-induced residual variance in a single model. Nevertheless, his model ignores the 
importance of time-varying betas, a phenomenon that may be particularly important around 
dramatic financial events (see, e.g., Brown et al. 1988; Zolotoy 2011; Lui et al. 2009). 
In this study, we investigate the market reaction to profit warnings using an event 
study methodology that addresses the conditional heteroskedastic behavior of volatility, the 
time-varying betas and the event-induced variance simultaneously. Our contribution to the 
literature is twofold. First, we examine whether the nature of profit warnings affects a stock’s 
beta. Brown et al. (1988) shows that stock betas increase following daily price shocks (daily 
residual returns) of ±2.5 percent or more. However, we argue that large daily price shocks 
may be caused by the behavior of noise traders rather than the arrival of news. Thus, using 
profit warnings as the events provides a cleaner test of the impact of the arrival of news on 
time-varying betas. Second, we propose an event study methodology that adjusts the 
abnormal return estimates and statistical tests for the time-varying betas and the event-
induced residual variances as well as the conditionally heteroskedastic behavior of volatility. 
Specifically, we improve on Savickas’ (2003) model by allowing the beta parameter of the 
market model to vary over time, while adjusting for the event-induced variance and 
conditional heteroskedasticity. We argue that this improvement is important not only because 
a stock beta varies systematically over time, but also because its variation is likely to be more 
pronounced around news events (Brown et al., 1988; Zolotoy, 2011; Lui et al., 2009).  
  The results of our study can be summarised briefly as follows. Firstly, we observe the 
highest positive (negative) abnormal returns on the day on which positive (negative) 
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warnings are released. We also report strong price reversal patterns following both positive 
and negative warnings. Secondly, consistent with Brown et al.’s (1988) view that surprises 
increase uncertainty, the average beta of event stocks increases significantly after both 
positive and negative warnings. Thirdly, we show that the statistical significance of the 
cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) following negative warning announcements disappears 
completely after we account for the time-varying betas. We also find that the time-varying 
beta adjustments reduce the magnitude and the statistical significance of the price reversal 
patterns following positive warnings. Fourthly, the average abnormal returns on the first two 
days following warnings containing positive news lose their significance after the event-
induced variance and conditional heteroskedasticity are accounted for, while the subsequent 
CARs become much smaller. Finally, we show that adjusting for time-varying betas, event-
induced variance and conditional heteroskedasticity simultaneously yields even smaller post-
positive-warning CARs. We argue that, although many of the post-positive-warning CARs 
remain significant after the incorporation of time-varying betas, event-induced variance and 
conditional heteroskedasticity in the modelling process, these patterns should not be used as 
evidence against the EMH for at least three reasons. First, the results from the pooled 
ordinary least square (OLS) regressions indicate that the post-positive-warning CARs are not 
related to the abnormal returns on the announcement days. This finding is not consistent with 
the prediction of the overreaction hypothesis, which suggests that greater overreaction would 
lead to greater correction (see, e.g., Cox and Peterson 1994; Choi and Jayaraman 2009). 
Second, the magnitude and the statistical significance of the post-positive-warning CARs are 
highly sensitive to the way in which abnormal returns are measured. Finally, incorporating 
time-varying betas, event-induced variance and conditional heteroskedasticity into the 
modelling process yields post-positive-warning CARs that are too small to cover the 
transaction costs that one would incur in pursuing a contrarian strategy.        
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the dataset. 
Section 3 presents the empirical tests and results. Section 4 provides some additional results 
and robustness checks, and Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Data 
The statements of profit warnings used in this study are obtained from the HKEx website. 
The exchange began publishing these statements in July 2007. Our initial sample includes all 
such statements issued during the period from July 2007 to July 2012. Daily closing prices of 
the issuing firms and the Hang Seng index are obtained from DataStream. Our final sample 
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constitutes a total of 1,723 profit warnings, of which 1,238 contain negative news and 485 
contain positive news about firms’ earnings prospects. The dominance of warnings 
containing negative news in our sample may be attributed to the fact that only bad news is 
emphasised in the “listing rules” in Hong Kong (see, e.g., Wang and Zhang 2011). 
Furthermore, several studies suggest that warnings are more likely to be issued prior to 
negative than positive news (see, e.g., Barmber and Cheon 1998; Libby and Tan 1999; Wang 
and Zhang 2011).    
 
3. Tests and results 
To estimate the abnormal returns around profit warnings, we initially use the standard event 
study methodology. Then, we relax the market model assumption that stock betas and 
residual variance are constant over time and not affected by the arrival of news. Specifically, 
we use a bivariate form of Engle and Kroner’s (1995) BEKK GARCH model to account for 
time-varying betas. Then, we employ a model developed by Savickas (2003) to control for 
the effect of event-induced variance and the heteroskedastic behavior of volatility on the 
abnormal return estimates. Finally, we improve on Savickas’ approach by allowing stock 
betas to vary over time. 
 
3.1. Standard event study 
The approach most commonly used to estimate expected returns is the market model:3  
 
,     2iitit σεvar 0,εE   ,                               (1) 
where Ri,t and Rm,t are day t’s continuously compounded returns of stock i and the market 
portfolio m, respectively;  and  are the parameters of the market model and  is the 
error term, which is assumed to have a zero mean and a constant variance, 2iσ . Eq.(1) is 
estimated over the [-200, -15] window prior to profit warnings. The abnormal return of stock 
i on day t, or ARi,t, is then estimated as 
   
.                                                  (2) 
                                                          
3
 Dyckman et al. (1984) show that the market model performs significantly better than other models, such as the 
index or average return models. Similarly, Armitage (1995: 25) argues that “…the market model is most 
commonly used to generate expected returns and no better alternative has yet been found despite the weak 
relationship between beta and actual returns…”. 
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The price effect of profit warnings is measured using the daily average abnormal 
return ( ) and the cumulative average abnormal return ( ). The average abnormal 
return on day t is computed as 
 
                                                                                                      (3) 
The cumulative abnormal return of stock i over a window of S days starting one day 
after the event is given as 
 
                                                                                                    (4) 
The average cumulative abnormal return over a window of S days beginning one day 
after the event and across N stocks, is computed as  
 
                                           .                                                                 (5)        
 
Two test statistics, T1 and T2, are used to assess the statistical significance of  and 
, respectively, and are specified as follows: 
 
                                          and   ,                                                    (6) 
where  and  are the standard deviations of ARi,t and CARi,s, respectively, and are 
estimated as 
 
               and . 
 
When standard assumptions hold, T1 and T2 follow Student t-distributions with N – 1 
degrees of freedom.4 
  Table 1 reports the average daily ARs and the CARs around profit warnings. Panel A 
reports the CARs following negative warnings. The average AR on the announcement date is 
                                                          
4
 For robustness purposes, we also use Newey-West heteroskedasticity, the serial correlation consistent 
estimator and the J-statistic of Campbell et al. (1997) and our conclusions remain unchanged. Details of these 
results are available upon request.  
 
8 
 
-3.46% and is highly significant (with a t-value of -16.73). The average CARs following the 
announcements of bad news are positive and significant, except for on day 1, with values 
increasing monotonically from 0.01% on day 1 to 1.25% for the [+1, +10] window. This 
finding indicates that, on average, an investor can earn a significant abnormal return of 1.25% 
by holding a stock for a period of ten days starting one day after a negative warning.  
 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Panel B presents the results on the price reaction to positive warnings. The average AR 
on the announcement date is positive (with a value of 3.9%) and is statistically significant at 
less than the 1% level. The average CARs following positive news are negative and highly 
significant, indicating strong price reversal following the arrival of good news. This finding 
suggests that, on average, an abnormal return of 2.82% can be earned by short selling a stock 
one day after a positive warning and repurchasing it ten days later. Our evidence is similar to 
that of Lui et al. (2009), who find strong share price reversal following negative warnings in 
the Chinese main market. Price reversal patterns are also documented by several studies on 
the price reaction to shocks. For instance, Atkins and Dyl (1990) report significantly negative 
(positive) average CARs from following the three largest winners (losers) on 500 randomly 
selected trading days from 1975 to 1984. Bremer and Sweeney (1991) examine stock price 
behavior following a one-day price change of -10% or less, and their results confirm the 
overreaction hypothesis.  
We argue that one weakness of the existing literature on the stock price reaction to 
profit warnings stems from the explicit assumption that the stock beta is constant over time 
and is not affected by the arrival of news. In this study, we adopt the bivariate form of Engle 
and Kroner’s (1995) BEKK GARCH model to estimate time-varying systematic risk and the 
conditional abnormal returns. 
 
3.2. Time-varying betas 
Following Tsui and Yu (1999), Choudhry (2005) and Choudhry et al. (2010), we use the 
bivariate form of Engle and Kroner’s (1995) BEKK GARCH to estimate the conditional 
betas of the market model. Under this model, the conditional variance-covariance matrix is 
specified as follows: 
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;   ),                                                    (7) 
,                                             (8) 
where  is a 2 x 1 vector containing the continuously compounded returns of 
stock i and the market portfolio m;  is a 2 x 1 vector of constants;  is a 2 x 2 conditional 
variance-covariance matrix, which depends on the elements of the information set  of the 
past value of the error term ;  ,  and  are 2 x 2 matrices of parameters.  
 Engle and Kroner (1995) argue that the BEKK model is sufficiently general as it 
includes all positive definite diagonal representations and nearly all positive definite vector 
representations. It has also been suggested that the BEKK model addresses an important 
weakness of the general specification of the multivariate GARCH by ensuring that the  
matrix is always positive definite (see, e.g., Bollerslev et al. 1994). 
          Eqs.(7) and (8) are estimated separately for the [-201, -1] and [0, +200] windows 
around warning dates, and the time-varying beta of stock i (  is computed as  
 
                                            ,                                                            (9)                               
where  and  are elements of the matrix  and are defined as the conditional 
covariance between stock i’s returns and the market portfolio returns, and the conditional 
variance of the market portfolio returns, respectively.     
The standard paired t-test and the non-parametric Wilcoxon signed rank test (WSRT) 
are used to judge whether the average pre-warning beta, measured over the [-201, -1] window 
prior to the announcement date, is significantly different from the average post-warning beta, 
measured over a window of S days beginning one day after the event.  
 To account for the potential effect of changes in beta on the abnormal returns around 
profit warnings, we estimate conditional beta-adjusted abnormal returns as follows: 
  
).                                          (10)5 
The average conditional beta-adjusted average ARs and CARs are calculated using Eqs.(2) 
and (5), respectively. The standard t-test is also used to gauge their statistical significance.  
Table 2 reports the changes in conditional betas following profit warnings. Panel A 
presents the changes in conditional betas following negative warnings. The mean (median) 
pre-warning conditional beta is 0.609 (0.579). The results suggest that the post-warning betas 
                                                          
5
 The parameter  is generated by regressing the variable (  against a constant term. 
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are higher than the pre-warning betas, across all post-event windows. Both the paired t-test 
and the WSRT suggest that the difference between the pre- and post-warning betas is 
statistically significant. Panel B presents the conditional betas around positive warnings. The 
mean (median) conditional beta over the [-201, -1] window prior to warnings containing 
positive news is 0.679 (0.685). Both the paired t-test and the WSRT indicate that stock betas 
increase significantly following the arrival of positive news. 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Figures 1 and 2 indicate the presence of a structural break in average daily betas 
following both positive and negative warning announcements. Specifically, the figures show 
that betas are relatively stable before warning announcements, increase substantially on the 
announcement dates and stabilise thereafter. In contrast to Patton and Verardo (2012), our 
results suggest that betas do not revert back to the pre-announcement average over the ten-
day window following warning announcements. 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figures 1 & 2 about here 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
We conduct two additional tests to investigate whether the changes in betas are indeed 
caused by the arrival of news. First, for each event stock, we select a date randomly from its 
pre-warning window. We treat the randomly selected dates as if they were the event dates. 
The paired t-test and WSRT suggest that the changes in beta following these pretended event 
dates are not significantly different from zero (the table is omitted to conserve space). 
Second, we match event stock with another stock from the same industry, with the closest 
market capitalization and with no price sensitive news within the [-10, +10] window around 
the warning announcement dates. In untabulated results, we find that the changes in the betas 
of the control stocks around the warning events are not significantly different from zero, 
implying that the increase in the post-warning betas is more likely to be caused by the arrival 
of news than the systematic time-varying nature of stock betas. This evidence is consistent 
with Kalay and Lowenstein (1985), Brown et al. (1988) and Patton and Verardo (2012), who 
show that, as surprises increase uncertainty, systematic risk increases significantly in the 
aftermath of both positive and negative news. Hence, ignoring the time-varying nature of the 
betas may result in biased abnormal return estimates. 
Table 3 reports the conditional beta-adjusted average ARs and conditional beta-
adjusted average CARs following the release of profit warnings. Panel A focuses on the 
negative warnings. Our results indicate that the post-warning CARs carry a positive sign. 
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However, none of these post-warning CARs is significantly different from zero. This 
evidence indicates that individual stocks in Hong Kong react efficiently to the negative news 
contained in profit warnings. Both the paired t-test and WSRT suggest that the values of 
time-varying-beta-adjusted CARs are significantly smaller than their corresponding market 
model CARs in Table 1. Panel B also presents the conditional beta-adjusted average ARs and 
CARs following positive warnings. Stock prices respond positively to the arrival of good 
news. The average conditional beta-adjusted abnormal return on the announcement date is 
4.11%. This figure is statistically significant at less than the 1% level. All post-warning 
conditional beta-adjusted CARs are significantly negative, ranging from CAR1 = -0.67% to 
CAR9 = -1.27%. Both the standard t-test and the WSRT indicate a significant decline in the 
values of post-positive-warning CARs following time-varying beta adjustment.  
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 about here 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
In short, the findings in this section suggest that the price reversal patterns following 
negative profit warnings are more likely to be the outcome of model misspecification than 
investors’ overreaction. However, while the negative CARs following positive warnings 
become small in magnitude, they remain highly significant even after the systematic 
variations in stock betas are accounted for. 
 
3.3. Conditional heteroskedasticity and event-induced variance 
As discussed earlier, the extant literature suggests that accounting for the conditionally 
heteroskedastic behavior of volatility and event-induced variance improves the market model 
parameter estimates and the power of the statistical tests. Following Savickas (2003), we 
estimate the abnormal returns as follows: 
 
                                       
 
where  in Eq.(11) is a residual term, with mean of zero and time-varying variance  
assumed to follow a GARCH (1,1) process6. The subscript  of the variable  
denotes the number of days after the event day t. , , ..., are dummy variables with a 
value of unity if , , ..., , respectively, and zero otherwise. 
                                                          
6 The results from GJR-GARCH (1,1) and E-GARCH (1,1) are very similar to those reported here. Further 
details are available upon request.  
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 is the change in the systematic risk measured over the window of length n after the profit 
warning. The rest of the variables are as defined previously. The parameter  in Eq.(11) 
reflects the abnormal returns around the event and the parameter  in Eq.(12) captures the 
event-induced residual variance. 
 Savickas (2003) argues that the increase in variance around events may result in the 
misspecification of the traditional test statistics, and proposes the following test to account for 
the stochastic behavior of volatility during both event and non-event periods: 
 
                                                  (13) 
where 
                                                                                                                     
where  is the estimated mean abnormal return of security i on a given day or window and 
 is the estimated standard deviation of the abnormal return on a given day (we use the 
average of  when abnormal returns are estimated over a window). The test statistic 
presented in Eq.(13) follows the Student t-distribution with N – 1 degrees of freedom. 
Savickas argues that his test has more power as it allows the event-induced volatility effect to 
differ across securities and each security’s variance to be stochastic outside the event period.  
 Table 4 presents the abnormal return estimates obtained using Savickas’ (2003) 
approach. Panel A shows that the abnormal returns following negative warnings are small 
and not significantly different from zero. The paired t-test suggests that, except on day 1, the 
CARs from Savickas’ model are significantly smaller than the CARs obtained using the 
standard event methodology approach (see Panel A of Table 1). The WSRT also indicates 
that the difference between the ARs and CARs from Savickas’ approach and the market 
model are significant for days 0 and +1 and for the window [+1, +9] after the negative 
warning. The ARs and CARs reported in Panel A are also smaller than their time-varying-
beta-adjusted counterparts (see Panel A of Table 3). Overall, the results in Panel A are 
consistent with the predictions of the EMH, which posits that stock prices adjust instantly and 
accurately to the arrival of news.  
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 4 about here 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Panel B of Table 4 shows that the average ARs and CARs from Savickas’ model, 
following positive warnings, are negative but much smaller than those from the standard 
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market model (Panel B of Table 1) and from the market model with time-varying beta (Panel 
B of Table 3). The AR1 and CAR2 after warnings containing positive news are not 
significantly different from zero. The subsequent CARs are significantly negative, but small 
in magnitude, ranging from -0.27% (CAR3) to -0.14% (CAR7). While the abnormal returns 
immediately after the events are not significant, the results suggest that, on average, short 
selling a stock immediately after a positive news announcement and repurchasing it ten days 
later would generate a return of 0.17%. However, the average (median) relative bid-ask 
spread associated with our sample stocks during the study period is 3.06% (1.92%). Thus, 
such price patterns may not yield profits in excess of transaction costs and therefore cannot 
be used as evidence against the EMH.             
 
3.4. Conditional heteroskedasticity, event-induced variance and time-varying betas 
Savickas (2003) explicitly assumes that stock betas are constant over time and not affected by 
the arrival of news. To address this potential limitation, we replace the constant  parameter 
in Eq.(11) with the time-varying betas generated by the BEKK GARCH model. We argue 
that allowing betas to be stochastic both within and outside of the event period should yield 
more accurate estimates of the abnormal return and residual variance and should, therefore, 
improve the power and accuracy of the cross-sectional test statistic presented in Eq.(13).  
The results of this analysis are reported in Table 5. Panel A shows that the average 
ARs and CARs following negative warnings are positive but not statistically significant 
(except for CAR6). The paired t-test and the non-parametric WSRT indicate that the ARs and 
CARs in Panel A of Table 5 are in many cases significantly smaller in magnitude than their 
market model counterparts (Panel A of Table 1). Panel B of Table 5 shows that the ARs and 
CARs following positive warnings are small, but remain negatively significant. The paired t-
test and the WSRT also suggest that the ARs and CARs in Panel B of Table 5 are 
significantly smaller than those generated by the standard market model. Furthermore, the 
ARs and CARs in Panel B of Table 5 are very similar in magnitude to those obtained using 
Savickas’ model (Panel B of Table 4), implying that profits in excess of transaction costs 
cannot be earned from the contrarian strategy. 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 5 about here 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
In summary, the market model CARs suggest that investors overreact to both positive 
and negative warnings. However, adjusting for the time-varying risk and the event-induced 
variance causes the overreaction patterns following negative news to disappear completely. 
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These adjustments also cause abnormal returns on days +1 and +2 after positive warnings to 
lose their statistical significant (see Section 3.3) and the magnitudes of the remaining post-
positive-warning CARs to decline to such an extent that a contrarian strategy does not earn a 
profit in excess of transaction costs. These findings are consistent with the large body of 
literature that posits that ignoring time-varying betas, the conditional heteroskedastic 
behavior of the residual variance, and the event-induced volatility may yield biased market 
model parameter estimates and inconsistent test statistics (e.g., Corhay and Tourani-Rad 
1994; Brown et al. 1988; Savickas 2003; Kolari and Pynn̈nen 2010). 
 
3.5. Multivariate analysis 
So far, we have shown that incorporating the time-varying betas, event-induced variance and 
conditional heteroskedasticity into the modelling process causes the overreaction patterns 
after negative warnings to disappear completely. These adjustments also yield smaller, and in 
some cases statistically insignificant, post-positive-warning CARs. However, the presence of 
some significantly negative, albeit small, post-positive-warning CARs may still be used as an 
argument for the overreaction hypothesis. To verify the validity of this claim, we estimate the 
following pooled OLS regression: 
 
    
(14) 
where  is firm i’s average cumulative abnormal return over a window of S days 
beginning one day after a positive warning;  is firm i’s average event-day abnormal 
return (both  and  are adjusted for the time-varying betas, event-adjusted variance 
and conditional heteroskedasticity);  is a vector of control variables, which includes 
a set of firm-specific variables that are deemed to influence stock returns. These variables 
include the book-to-market ratio ( ), the natural logarithm of stock i’s market 
capitalization measure (  and the average turnover – i.e., the daily trading volume 
divided by the number of shares outstanding ( ).  and  are measured 11 
days prior to the positive warning, while  is computed over the [-105, -6] window 
prior to the positive warning. Industry and year dummies are included to control for the 
industry and year fixed effects. We also correct standard errors for firm-level clustering. 
If the overreaction hypothesis holds, the parameter  in Eq.(14) will be negative and 
significant, as the greater overreaction would lead to a greater correction (see, e.g., Cox and 
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Peterson, 1994; Choi and Jayaraman, 2009). Fama and French (1993, 1996) show that 
 and  are amongst the key determinants of cross-sectional stock returns. If 
smaller stocks reverse more than larger stocks,  is expected to be negative and significant 
(see, e.g., Bremer and Sweeney 1991). The parameter  is expected to be positive, as 
investors may overreact to a greater extent when positive warnings are made by mature firms 
than when they are made by growth firms7. Finally, if the price reversal process is caused by 
illiquidity,  is expected to be negative and significant (see, e.g., Choi and Jayaraman 
2009).   
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 6 about here 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  
The results of the pooled OLS estimates are shown in Table 6. The coefficient  is 
negative for all post-event CARs, but only significant in the case of CAR3. This evidence 
contradicts the predictions of the overreaction hypothesis, which suggests that greater 
overreaction causes greater correction. The results indicate that the post-positive-warning 
price patterns are unlikely to be driven by the size effect, as the coefficient  carries a 
positive, rather than the predicted negative, sign for all post-event CARs except for AR1 
(significant at the 5% level) and CAR4 (statistically insignificant). The coefficient  is 
generally negative, but only significant in the case of CAR4, which is too far from the event 
date. This finding suggests that growth opportunities do not play a major role in determining 
the post-positive-warning price reversal patterns. Finally,  is negative, but not statistically 
significant, indicating that the post-positive-warning price patterns cannot be attributed to the 
illiquidity effect. 
  
4. Robustness checks 
 
4.1. Alternative estimations of time-varying betas 
While the BEKK model has been widely used to estimate the conditional betas of the market 
model (Tsui and Yu 1999; Choudhry 2005; Choudhry et al. 2010), a number of other 
techniques have emerged for modelling and estimating time-varying betas8. For robustness 
purposes, we also estimate conditional betas using other popular members of the multivariate 
                                                          
7
 The earnings of mature firms tend to be more stable and predictable than those of growth firms. Therefore, 
investors’ surprise is likely to be greater when warnings are issued by mature firms.   
8
 See, for example, Faff et al. (2000) for a detailed review of these techniques. 
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GARCH (M-GARCH) model family. Following Faff et al. (2000), we estimate a time series 
of conditional betas, , for a stock i as 
 
                                                                    (15) 
where  and  are the time-varying conditional variances for the stock and the market, 
respectively, and  is the covariance between the stock and the market returns, which is 
assumed constant to overcome the onerous computational burden (see, e.g., Pagan, 1996). 
The time-varying conditional variances (  and ) are initially modelled using the 
standard GARCH (1,1) specification. Then, the Exponential GARCH (EGARCH) of Nelson 
(1991) and the Threshold GARCH (TGARCH) of Glosten et al. (1993) are employed to 
model the asymmetry in the stock price volatility reaction to positive and negative shocks. 
Following Faff et al. (2000), we also use the in-sample mean squared error of forecasts, or 
, to assess the accuracy of each forecasted beta series (including 
those obtained using the BEKK model). Here,  are the predicted values of stock i’s return 
series generated from the single index model with time-varying betas generated from Eq.(15), 
and T is the number of days in the estimation period. 
 The GARCH-, TGARCH- and EGARCH-based time-varying beta estimates are 
provided in Panel A of Table 7. The time-varying betas from the standard GARCH model are 
similar to those obtained from the BEKK model (see Table 2). Specifically, the GARCH 
model indicates that stock betas increase in the aftermath of news, but the increase is more 
pronounced following good than bad news. The TGARCH estimates suggest that stock betas 
increase significantly after positive warnings, but exhibit no significant changes following 
warnings containing negative news. The EGARCH model suggests that stock betas do not 
exhibit any significant changes in the post-warning periods, irrespective of the news 
contained in the warnings. Panel A of Table 7 also reports the average mean squared errors 
(MSEs) associated with the different conditional beta estimates. It shows that the post-
negative-warning (post-positive-warning) average MSEs associated with the GARCH- and 
TGARCH-based estimates are 12.54x10-4 and 12.53x10-4 (23.93x10-4 and 23.94x10-4), 
respectively. However, the EGARCH estimates generate average MSEs of 50.10x10-4 and 
50.47x10-4 for the cases of negative and positive warnings, respectively. This evidence 
suggests that GARCH and TGARCH estimates provide relatively more accurate forecasts of 
17 
 
time-varying betas than EGARCH9. It also implies that stock betas are more likely to exhibit 
significant increases after good news than bad news.   
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 7 about here 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
To gain further insight into whether the price patterns following warnings depend on 
the way the conditional betas are estimated, we reestimate the ARs and CARs reported in 
Table 3 using the procedure described in Section 3.2, but with time-varying betas generated 
using the GARCH, TGARCH and EGARCH models, respectively. The results in Panel B of 
Table 7 indicate that, despite some variations in the magnitude and the statistical significance 
of the post-warning CARs, the general price patterns do not seem to depend on how the 
conditional betas are estimated and are consistent with those outlined earlier (see Section 
3.2). Specifically, Panel B of Table 7 shows that the price reversal patterns following 
negative profit warnings disappear (almost) completely when the betas are allowed to vary 
over time. It also shows that, while the CARs following warnings containing good news 
remain significantly negative, their values decline considerably once adjusted for the time-
varying betas10. 
 
4.2. Subperiod analysis 
Many studies suggest that the stock market is becoming more efficient over time (e.g., 
Sullivan et al., 1999) suggesting that the post-warning price patterns may also vary over time. 
To test this prediction, we subdivide the sample into two subperiods: July 2007 to July 2009 
and August 2009 to July 201211. Table 8 presents the ARs and CARs from the standard 
market model (Section 3.1), the market model with time-varying betas (Section 3.2), the 
Savikas model (Section 3.3) and the Savikas model with time-varying betas (Section 3.4). 
Panel A of Table 8 presents the post-negative-warning and post-positive-warning ARs and 
CARs for the period from July 2007 to July 2009. The market model produces price patterns 
that are consistent with the predictions of the overreaction hypothesis. Specifically, the 
market model CARs following negative shocks are positive and significant, with an average 
                                                          
9
 The average MSEs from the BEKK model are 12.58x10-4 and 24.06x10-4 for the negative and positive 
warnings, respectively. These figures are very close to those produced by the GARCH and TGARCH methods, 
but deviate considerably from those generated by EGARCH. 
10
 Note that we also repeat the analysis in Section 4.4 using time-varying beta estimates from GARCH, 
TGARCH and EGARCH and our conclusions remain largely unchanged. Further details are available upon 
request. 
11
 Subdividing the sample into three and four subperiods does not alter our main conclusions and the results are 
available upon request. 
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CAR of 2.4% to be earned over the ten-day window following a negative warning. Similarly, 
the post-positive-warning CARs are significantly negative, with a contrarian strategy earning 
an average CAR of -4.1% over the ten-day window after the announcement date. However, 
alternative abnormal return estimation methods imply that the post-warning price patterns are 
likely to be due to a bad model problem. Specifically, adjusting for the time-varying betas 
causes the post-negative-warning price patterns to disappear completely and the magnitude of 
the post-positive-warning CARs to decline considerably. The post-warning CARs become 
even smaller after the stochastic behavior of volatility during both event and non-event 
periods have been accounted for. In particular, CARs from Savickas’ (2003) model are not 
significantly different from zero following warnings containing bad news, and are very small, 
and in many cases insignificant, after warnings containing good news. The simultaneous 
adjustment for the time-varying beta, event-induced variance and conditional 
heteroskedasticity yields slightly smaller CARs than the Savickas model.  
 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 8 about here 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------    
 
The post-negative-warning and post-positive-warning ARs and CARs for the period 
from August 2009 to July 2012 are presented in Panel B of Table 8. The results indicate that 
the price patterns following warnings with bad news are consistent with the EMH, 
irrespective of the abnormal return estimates. However, the post-positive-warning CARs 
seem to depend largely on the estimation method. The market model CARs suggest that 
investors overreact to warnings containing good news. Specifically, the post-positive-warning 
market model CARs are significantly negative and increase monotonically from CAR1 = -
0.7% to CAR10 = -2.3%. The market model with time-varying betas generates similar results, 
but with slightly smaller post-positive-warning CARs (CAR1 = -0.6% and CAR10 = -1.7%). 
The Savickas (2003) approach breaks the monotonic abnormal return patterns, causing a 
large decline in the magnitude and the disappearance of the statistical significance of some of 
the post-positive-warning CARs. Similar results are obtained when the beta parameter in the 
Savickas model is allowed to vary systematically over time. Specifically, on average, 
shorting a stock one day after a positive warning and repurchasing it ten days later would 
only yield an abnormal profit of 0.1%. This figure is considerably smaller than the average 
(median) relative bid-ask spread of 2.75% (1.71%) associated with the sample stocks during 
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this period, implying that the contrarian strategy is not profitable after accounting for 
transaction costs12.  
   
5. Conclusion 
This study examines the impact of announcements containing profit warnings on the risk and 
return characteristics of the underlying stocks. Our main purpose is to test whether the price 
reaction anomalies around profit warnings survive adjustments for the time-varying beta, 
event-induced variance and conditional heteroskedasticity. The standard event study 
methodology indicates the presence of strong price reversal patterns following both positive 
and negative warnings. Specifically, the abnormal returns are positive (negative) on the days 
on which positive (negative) warnings are released and negative (positive) on the subsequent 
days. These results are consistent with the findings of Lui et al. (2009), Bremer and Sweeney 
(1991) and Atkins and Dyl (1990).  
Several studies show that the betas and residual variances of individual stocks are 
affected by the arrival of news (e.g., Brown et al. 1988; Grullon et al. 2005; DeAngelo et al. 
2006). Others find that the residual variance of the standard market model varies 
systematically over time (see, e.g., Patell and Wolfson 1979; Kalay and Lowenstein 1985; 
Kolari and Pynn̈nen 2010). This study shows that relaxing these assumptions results in post-
warning abnormal returns patterns that are largely consistent with the predictions of the 
EMH. 
In conclusion, the results of this study suggest that, while the literature seems to 
produce several price anomalies, the efficient market hypothesis should only be rejected if the 
abnormal returns estimates survive stringent tests. Our conclusion is consistent with Park 
(1995), who finds that the overreaction to large price change disappears after bid-ask spread 
bounces are accounted for, and Fama (1998), who finds that most of the return anomalies 
around corporate announcement events are mitigated with reasonable changes to the way 
abnormal returns are measured.         
 
                                                          
12
 We also stratify our sample stocks into different size and industry subsamples and our results remain 
unchanged. Specifically, we show that the magnitude and statistical significance of CARs are highly sensitive to 
the estimation method. While the standard market model results are in many cases consistent with the 
predictions of the overreaction hypotheses, the price patterns obtained after accounting for the time-varying 
betas, event-induced variance and conditional heteroskedasticity are generally consistent with the predictions of 
the EMH. Further details of these results are available upon request.  
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Table 1 Price reaction to profit warnings: Standard event study approach 
  Panel A: Negative warnings Panel B: Positive warnings 
  Value (%) t-statistic Value (%) t-statistic 
 
-3.46*** -16.73 4.16*** 12.46 
 
-0.01 0.04 -0.90*** -5.00 
 
0.41* 1.76 -1.27*** -4.68 
 
0.49* 1.89 -1.30*** -4.31 
 
0.55* 1.87 -1.43*** -4.30 
 
0.74** 2.22 -1.73*** -4.89 
 
0.90** 2.45 -1.98*** -5.04 
 
1.02*** 2.58 -2.15*** -5.10 
 
1.09*** 2.66 -2.40*** -5.51 
 
1.28*** 2.97 -2.71*** -5.99 
 
1.25*** 2.73 -2.82*** -5.87 
N 1238   485   
The abnormal return of stock i on day t, or ARi,t, is estimated using the parameters of the standard market model 
over the [-200, -15] window prior to profit warnings. The price effect of profit warnings is measured using the 
daily average abnormal return ( ) and the cumulative average abnormal return ( ). The average abnormal 
return on day t is given by . 
The cumulative abnormal return of stock i over a window of S days starting one day after the event is given by 
. 
The average cumulative abnormal return over a window of S days beginning one day after the shock and across 
N stocks is given by . 
A standard t-test is used to check the statistical significance of  and .   
***
, 
**
 and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 2 Conditional betas following profit warnings 
Panel A: Conditional betas around negative warnings 
 
Mean t-statistic Median t-statistic 
 
0.609 
 
0.579 
 
 
0.655*** 4.14 0.625*** 4.30 
 
0.654*** 3.98 0.623*** 4.14 
 
0.653*** 3.88 0.623*** 4.17 
 
0.652*** 3.61 0.622*** 4.12 
 
0.652*** 3.69 0.622*** 4.12 
 
0.652*** 3.74 0.619*** 4.08 
 
0.652*** 3.78 0.619*** 4.08 
 
0.653*** 3.82 0.619*** 4.08 
 
0.653*** 3.89 0.619*** 4.10 
 
0.654*** 3.93 0.617*** 4.11 
N                                                                                 1238 
Panel B: Conditional betas around positive warnings 
 
Mean t-statistic Median t-statistic 
 
0.679 
 
0.685 
 
 
0.729*** 2.93 0.707*** 2.96 
 
0.726*** 2.76 0.707*** 2.86 
 
0.727*** 2.78 0.709*** 2.86 
 
0.728*** 2.88 0.709*** 2.93 
 
0.728*** 2.89 0.709*** 2.90 
 
0.728*** 2.88 0.711*** 2.88 
 
0.728*** 2.90 0.711*** 2.90 
 
0.728*** 2.89 0.711*** 2.89 
 
0.728*** 2.90 0.711*** 2.91 
 
0.729*** 2.93 0.711*** 2.94 
N                                                                                  485 
We use the bivariate form of Engle and Kroner’s (1995) BEKK GARCH model to estimate the conditional 
betas. The model is estimated separately for the [-201,-1] and [0, +200] windows around announcement dates. 
The standard paired t-test and the non-parametric Wilcoxon signed rank test (WSRT) are used to judge whether 
the average pre-warning announcement beta, measured over the [-201, -1] window prior to the announcement 
date, is significantly different from the average post-warning beta, measured over a window of S days beginning 
one day after the event.   
***
, 
** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.  
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Table 3 Price reaction to profit warnings: The conditional market model approach 
Panel A: Negative warnings 
 
    Conditional versus unconditional 
 
Value (%) t-statistic t-statistic Z-score   
 
-3.54 -16.14*** -4.97*** -5.49*** 
 
-0.16 -0.92 -4.73*** -4.82*** 
 
0.04 0.18 -6.52*** -5.80*** 
 
-0.02 -0.07 -8.27*** -7.15*** 
 
-0.03 -0.10 -8.14*** -7.25*** 
 
-0.01 -0.04 -8.68*** -7.76*** 
 
0.01 0.03 -8.60*** -7.81*** 
 
-0.06 -0.18 -8.74*** -7.92*** 
 
-0.16 -0.44 -8.97*** -8.18*** 
 
-0.17 -0.44 -9.27*** -8.39*** 
 
-0.32 -0.79 -9.05*** -8.08*** 
N 1238  
Panel B: Positive warnings 
 
    Conditional versus unconditional 
 
Value (%) t-statistic t-statistic           Z-score 
 
4.11 12.87*** 4.43*** 5.73*** 
 
-0.67 -3.96*** 5.59*** 5.68*** 
 
-0.75 -3.10*** 7.20*** 7.21*** 
 
-0.67 -2.37*** 7.76*** 8.15*** 
 
-0.67 -2.23*** 7.79*** 7.89*** 
 
-0.85 -2.60*** 7.41*** 8.29*** 
 
-0.97 -2.70*** 8.12*** 8.24*** 
 
-1.05 -2.73*** 8.44*** 8.51*** 
 
-1.12 -2.80*** 8.31*** 8.43*** 
 
-1.27 -3.06*** 8.14*** 8.35*** 
 
-1.19 -2.73*** 8.11*** 8.38*** 
N 485 
To account for the potential effect of changes in beta on the abnormal returns around profit warnings, we 
estimate conditional beta-adjusted abnormal returns, , as follows: 
                                            )                                                                                             
where is a time-varying beta estimated using the bivariate form of Engle and Kroner’s (1995) BEKK 
GARCH model, which is estimated separately for the [-201, -1] and [0, +200] windows around the 
announcement dates. The average conditional beta-adjusted abnormal returns, , are calculated by 
                                            . 
The time-varying beta-adjusted cumulative abnormal return of stock i over a window of S days starting one day 
after the event is given by 
                              .                                                                    
The average time-varying beta-adjusted cumulative abnormal return over a window of S days beginning one day 
after the shock and across N stocks is computed by . 
The standard t-test is used to assess the statistical significance of the price effect; ***, ** and * indicate 
significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 4 Price reaction to profit warnings: The role of event-induced variance and 
conditional heteroskedasticity 
Panel A: Negative warnings 
 
    Conditional versus unconditional 
 
Value (%) t-statistic t-statistic Z-score   
 
-3.48 -7.66*** 0.18 4.93*** 
 
0.00 -0.50 0.01 2.19** 
 
0.03 -1.16 1.89* 0.94 
 
-0.04 -1.30 2.49** 1.30 
 
-0.10 -0.28 2.55** 0.75 
 
0.02 -0.78 2.61*** 1.32 
 
0.12 0.87 2.48** 0.88 
 
0.22 0.11 2.25** 1.31 
 
0.10 0.33 2.64*** 1.04 
 
0.04 0.10 3.21*** 1.97** 
 
0.14 0.95 2.62*** 1.52 
N 1238  
Panel B: Positive warnings 
 
    Conditional versus unconditional 
 
Mean (%) t-statistic t-statistic           Z-score 
 
3.92 4.26*** -0.06 -4.05*** 
 
-0.85 -1.27 0.14 -4.76*** 
 
-0.39 -1.33 -5.13*** -6.13*** 
 
-0.27 -2.31** -4.76*** -6.05*** 
 
-0.19 -2.96*** -4.67*** -5.06*** 
 
-0.15 -2.33** -5.34*** -5.73*** 
 
-0.25 -4.04*** -5.20*** -6.28*** 
 
-0.14 -3.71*** -5.39*** -6.39*** 
 
-0.17 -3.74*** -5.78*** -6.54*** 
 
-0.18 -3.26*** -6.22*** -6.86*** 
 
-0.17 -3.72*** -6.01*** -6.72*** 
N 485 
We use Savickas’ (2003) model to estimate the abnormal returns 
                                        
where  is a residual term, with a mean of zero and a time-varying variance  assumed to follow a GARCH 
(1,1) process. The rest of the variables are defined as previously. The parameter  reflects the abnormal 
returns around the event and the parameter  captures the event-induced residual variance. We use the 
following statistics to account for the stochastic behavior of volatility during both event and non-event periods: 
,    where                                                                                        
where  is the estimated mean abnormal return of security i on a given day or window and  is the estimated 
standard deviation of the abnormal return on a given day (we use the average of  when abnormal returns are 
estimated over a window). The test statistic presented in Eq.(15) follows the Student t-distribution with N – 1 
degrees of freedom.  
***
, 
**
 and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 5 Price reaction to profit warnings: The role of event-induced variance, 
conditional heteroskedasticity and time-varying betas 
Panel A: Negative warnings 
 
    Conditional versus unconditional 
 
Value (%)  t-statistic t-statistic Z-score   
-3.46 -5.95
 
0.25 1.89
* 
0.44 1.11 -1.11
 
1.22
 
0.28 -0.63 0.72
 
-0.12 
-0.04 -1.64 2.57
** 
1.32 
0.32 1.09 0.76
 
0.09 
0.00 -0.53 2.63
*** 
1.38 
0.23 2.14
** 
2.07
** 
0.82 
0.12 1.16 2.59
*** 
1.35 
0.16 0.10 2.53
** 
1.00 
0.10 1.16 3.00
*** 
1.72
* 
0.05 0.30 2.89
*** 
1.75
* 
N 1238  
Panel B: Positive warnings 
 
    Conditional versus unconditional 
 
Value (%) t-statistic t-statistic           Z-score 
3.88 4.19
 
0.14 -3.47
*** 
-0.92 -1.79
* 
0.54 -4.00
*** 
-0.57 -2.23
** 
-2.71
*** 
-5.43
*** 
-0.34 -3.04
*** 
-4.26
*** 
-5.50
*** 
-0.15 -3.47
*** 
-4.59
*** 
-4.71
*** 
-0.09 -2.40
** 
-5.36
*** 
-5.74
*** 
-0.19 -3.77
*** 
-5.30
*** 
-6.27
*** 
-0.25 -4.96
*** 
-5.17
*** 
-6.12
*** 
-0.16 -3.73
*** 
-5.74
*** 
-6.56
*** 
-0.12 -3.14
*** 
-6.29
*** 
-6.93
*** 
-0.16 -4.35
*** 
-6.07
*** 
-6.76
*** 
N 485 
We allow the beta parameter in Savickas’ (2003) model to vary over time. Specifically, we estimate the 
abnormal returns as follows: 
                                        
where  is a residual term, with a mean of zero and a time-varying variance  assumed to follow a GARCH 
(1,1) process,  is the time-varying beta estimated from the BEKK GARCH model, and the rest of the 
variables are defined as previously. The parameter  reflects the abnormal returns around the event and the 
parameter  captures the event-induced residual variance. We use the following statistics to account for the 
stochastic behavior of volatility during both event and non-event periods: 
,    where                                                                                        
where  is the estimated mean abnormal return of security i on a given day or window and  is the estimated 
standard deviation of the abnormal return on a given day (we use the average of  when abnormal returns are 
estimated over a window). The test statistic presented in Eq.(15) follows a Student t-distribution with N – 1 
degrees of freedom. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 6 Multivariate regressions 
  
          
Constant  -4.57** -4.61** -1.05 -0.74 -0.93 -0.67 -0.9 -0.6 -0.96* -0.51 
 
(-2.32) (-2.01) (-1.05) (-0.56) (-0.89) (-0.92) (-1.30) (-1.13) (-1.82) (-1.04) 
  
-1.94 -5.99 -4.65** -3.59 -3.25 0.1 -0.94 -0.77 -0.7 -0.76 
 
(-0.48) (-1.64) (-2.46)  (-1.49) (-1.37) (0.08) (-0.75) (-0.83) (-0.74) (-0.91) 
 
0.54** 0.322 0.07 -0.05 0.05 0.08 0.03 0.03 0.06 0.04 
 
(2.33) (1.46) (0.74) (-0.43) (0.49) (1.09) (0.55) (0.57) (1.12) (0.85) 
 
-0.015 0.023 -0.00 -0.01** -0.02 -0.00 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
 
(-0.51) -0.74 (-1.33) (-2.50) (-1.33) (-0.12) (0.56) (-1.21) (-1.36) (-0.55) 
 
-1.77 -0.243 -0.442 -0.35 -0.14 0.241 -0.457 0.157 -0.182 -0.22 
 
(-1.05) (-0.16) (-0.58) (-0.48) (-0.25) -0.42 (-1.00) (0.33) (-0.46) (-0.49) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 484 484 484 484 484 484 484 484 484 484 
Adjusted R2 0.008 0.019 0.016 0.004 0.005 0.007 0.012 0.011 0.012 0.001 
This table reports the results of the following pooled OLS regression: 
      
where is firm i’s average cumulative abnormal return over windows of S days following positive warnings;  is firm i’s average 
abnormal return on the event date (both  and are adjusted for the time-varying betas, event-adjusted variance and conditional 
heteroskedasticity);  is a vector of control variables, which include a set of firm-specific variables that are deemed to influence 
stock returns. These variables include the book-to-market ratio ( ), the natural logarithm of stock i’s market capitalization measure 
(  and the average turnover – i.e., the daily trading volume divided by the number of shares outstanding ( ).  and 
 are measured 11 days prior to positive warnings, while  is computed over the [-105, -6] windows prior to the positive 
warnings. Industry and year dummies are included to control for the industry and year fixed effects. We also correct standard errors for 
firm-level clustering. 
The figures in parentheses are the t-statistics. 
The regression coefficients are multiplied by 102. 
***
, 
** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 7 Alternative time-varying beta estimates 
Panel A: Time-varying betas 
  GARCH TGARCH EGARCH 
 
Negative warn Positive warn Negative warn Positive warn Negative warn Positive warn 
 
Mean 
(%) t-stat 
Mean 
(%) t-stat 
Mean 
(%) t-stat 
Mean 
(%) t-stat 
Mean 
(%) t-stat 
Mean 
(%) t-stat 
 
0.64 
 
0.73 
 
0.64 
 
0.73 
 
0.63 
 
0.66 
 
 
0.67** 2.44 0.89*** 7.96 0.66 1.53 0.88*** 7.59 0.62 -0.19 0.71** 2.03 
 
0.67** 2.43 0.88*** 8.27 0.66 1.33 0.87*** 7.81 0.63 0.15 0.70* 1.81 
 
0.66** 2.19 0.87*** 8.22 0.65 0.98 0.87*** 7.82 0.62 -0.29 0.69 1.51 
 
0.66* 1.82 0.87*** 8.08 0.65 0.66 0.86*** 7.75 0.62 -0.48 0.69 1.25 
 
0.66 1.58 0.86*** 7.90 0.65 0.40 0.86*** 7.63 0.62 -0.63 0.68 1.06 
 
0.65 1.36 0.85*** 7.69 0.64 0.21 0.85*** 7.49 0.62 -0.76 0.68 0.92 
 
0.65 1.18 0.85*** 7.42 0.64 0.09 0.85*** 7.23 0.62 -0.81 0.68 0.80 
 
0.65 1.02 0.84*** 7.18 0.64 0.00 0.84*** 6.98 0.62 -0.81 0.67 0.69 
 
0.65 0.88 0.84*** 7.02 0.64 0.18 0.84*** 6.82 0.61 -0.97 0.67 0.59 
 
0.65 0.81 0.84*** 6.90 0.64 0.32 0.84*** 6.70 0.61 -1.11 0.67 0.52 
MSE 12.54x10-4 23.92x10-4 12.53x10-4 23.94x10-4 50.10x10-4 50.47x10-4 
Panel B: Time-varying beta-adjusted ARs and CARs  
  GARCH TGARCH EGARCH 
 
Negative warn Positive warn Negative warn Positive warn Negative warn Positive warn 
 
Value 
(%) t-stat 
Value 
(%) t-stat 
Value 
(%) t-stat 
Value 
(%) t-stat 
Value 
(%) t-stat 
Value 
(%) t-stat 
 
-
3.45*** -16.76 3.93*** 12.47 -3.45*** -16.76 3.93*** 12.47 -3.46*** -16.21 3.98*** 12.04 
 
0.01 0.04 -0.83*** -5.00 0.01 0.04 -0.83*** -5.00 -0.03 -0.16 -0.85*** -5.06 
 
0.40* 1.74 -1.14*** -4.68 0.40* 1.74 -1.14*** -4.68 0.35 1.51 -1.12*** -4.79 
 
0.49* 1.89 -1.22*** -4.31 0.49* 1.89 -1.22*** -4.31 0.45* 1.71 -1.15*** -4.08 
 
0.54* 1.86 -1.32*** -4.30 0.54* 1.86 -1.32*** -4.30 0.55* 1.89 -1.27*** -4.12 
 
0.72** 2.21 -1.63*** -4.89 0.72** 2.21 -1.63*** -4.89 0.71** 2.14 -1.58*** -4.73 
 
0.87** 2.45 -1.89*** -5.04 0.87** 2.45 -1.89*** -5.04 0.90** 2.48 -1.80*** -4.73 
 
0.98*** 2.58 -2.05*** -5.10 0.98** 2.58 -2.05*** -5.10 0.96** 2.46 -1.98*** -4.83 
 1.04*** 2.66 -2.33*** -5.51 
1.04**
*
 2.66 -2.33*** -5.51 1.04*** 2.59 -2.26*** -5.22 
 1.24*** 2.97 -2.61*** -5.99 
1.24**
*
 2.97 -2.61*** -5.99 1.20*** 2.82 -2.57*** -5.75 
 1.18*** 2.73 -2.68*** -5.87 
1.18**
*
 2.73 -2.68*** -5.87 1.13*** 2.54 -2.54*** -5.46 
Following Faff et al. (2000), we estimate a time series of conditional betas, , for a stock i as 
                                                          
where  and  are the time-varying conditional variances of the stock and the market, respectively, and  
is the covariance between the stock and market returns, which is assumed to be constant. The time-varying 
conditional variances (  and ) are modelled using the standard GARCH (1,1), TGARCH(1,1) and 
EGARCH(1,1). We use the in-sample mean squared error of forecasts, or , to assess 
the accuracy of each forecasted beta series (including those obtained from the BEKK model). Here,  are the 
predicted values of stock i’s return series generated from the single index model with timing-varying betas, and 
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T is the number of days in the estimation period. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, 
respectively. 
Table 8 Subperiod analysis 
Panel A: Price reaction to profit warnings: July 2007 to July 2009  
 
Market model 
Time-varying beta 
adjustment (BEKK) 
Savickas (2003) 
model 
Savickas (2003) with 
time-varying betas 
 
Negative 
warning 
Positive 
warning 
Negative 
warning 
Positive 
warning 
Negative 
warning 
Positive 
warning 
Negative 
warning 
Positive 
warning 
 
-3.31*** 6.04*** -3.47*** 6.08*** -2.94*** 6.79*** -3.44*** 6.01*** 
 
0.14 -1.40*** 0.02 -1.19*** 0.39 -1.34 -0.01 -1.05** 
 
0.85** -2.28*** 0.60* -1.95*** 0.07 -0.87 -0.03** -0.76 
 
1.06*** -2.40*** 0.60 -1.91*** 0.06 -0.80** -0.06 -0.78** 
 
1.16*** -2.63*** 0.54 -2.10** -0.13 -0.68** 0.15 -0.81*** 
 
1.49*** -2.37*** 0.69 -1.84** 0.01 -0.18 -0.17 -0.27 
 
1.79*** -2.99*** 0.87* -2.31** 0.19 -0.32** 0.10 -0.27** 
 
2.00*** -3.14*** 0.92* -2.34** 0.31 -0.26** 0.07 -0.30** 
 
2.21*** -3.99*** 1.03* -3.04*** 0.13 -0.34** 0.12 -0.35** 
 
2.45*** -4.14*** 1.10* -3.27*** 0.12 -0.39** 0.00 -0.27* 
 
2.37*** -4.09*** 0.86 -3.17*** 0.20 -0.30** 0.08 -0.23* 
N 718 98 718 98 718 98 718 98 
Panel B: Price reaction to profit warnings: August 2009 to July 2012 
 
Market model 
Time-varying beta 
adjustment (BEKK) 
Savickas (2003) 
model 
Savickas (2003) with 
time-varying betas 
 
Negative 
warning 
Positive 
warning 
Negative 
warning 
Positive 
warning 
Negative 
warning 
Positive 
warning 
Negative 
warning 
Positive 
warning 
 
-3.61*** 3.39*** -3.53*** 3.44*** -4.27*** 3.20*** -3.44*** 3.36*** 
 
-0.18 -0.68*** -0.03 -0.56*** -0.53 -0.72 -0.01 -0.91 
 
-0.24 -0.83*** -0.06 -0.72*** -0.02 -0.27** -0.03** -0.52* 
 
-0.32 -0.91*** -0.13 -0.74** -0.19 -0.14 -0.06 -0.23** 
 
-0.37 -0.98*** -0.07 -0.75** -0.07 -0.06** 0.15 0.01** 
 
-0.38 -1.42*** -0.09 -1.14*** 0.01 -0.14** -0.17* -0.04** 
 
-0.43 -1.60*** -0.06 -1.25*** 0.01 -0.23*** 0.10 -0.18*** 
 
-0.49 -1.77*** -0.08 -1.32*** 0.08 -0.11*** 0.07 -0.23*** 
 
-0.61 -1.90*** -0.15 -1.37*** 0.07 -0.13*** 0.12 -0.11*** 
 
-0.49 -2.21*** 0.00 -1.62*** -0.08 -0.13*** 0.00 -0.09*** 
 
-0.53 -2.32*** 0.02 -1.67*** 0.06 -0.14*** 0.08 -0.14*** 
N 522 387 522 387 522 387 522 387 
This table reports the average abnormal returns ( ) and the average cumulative abnormal returns ( ) from 
the standard market model (Section 3.1), the market model with time-varying betas (Section 3.2), the Savikas 
model (Section 3.3) and the Savikas model with time-varying betas (Section 3.4), separately for the periods July 
2007 to July 2009 and August 2009 to July 2012. 
***
, 
** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Figure 1 Changes in beta around positive warnings 
 
 
Figure 2 Changes in beta around negative warnings 
 
